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In this target article McCullough et al. present a fascinating view
on revenge, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Whereas the existence
of forgiveness in nonhuman animals may be controversial (and dif-
ficult to demonstrate), there is compelling evidence for revenge
and reconciliation. In addition, the key function of revenge in
imposing a retaliatory cost on aggressors has already been pro-
posed for macaques (Aureli et al. 1992; cf. Clutton-Brock &
Parker 1995). Thus, it seems that humans share both the form
and function of revenge with other animals. Why then do McCul-
lough et al. hypothesize that humans have evolved a cognitive
system that implements the deterrence strategy, which they
label a revenge system? Are McCullough et al. implying that
animals, which show similar revenge patterns to those of
humans, have the same cognitive revenge system? If so, humans
did not evolve it but have adapted it from what a common ances-
tor already had in place. However, McCullough et al. are more
likely implying that humans have evolved a unique cognitive
system for revenge that is too complex for other animal species.
The revenge system presented in the target article is indeed
complex. Whereas humans certainly have the cognitive abilities
to implement such a system, is it really necessary to explain the
majority of cases of revenge perpetrated by human beings?
Couldn’t a simpler mechanism based on emotional mediation be
at the core of the patterns of revenge that have been reported
for humans and other animals? There has been growing attention
to the mediating role of emotions in humans (Frijda 1986; Pank-
sepp 1989; Rolls 1995) and other animals (Aureli & Schaffner
2002; Aureli & Whiten 2003; Crook 1989; Lott 1991; Owren &
Rendall 1997; Pryce 1996). An important function of emotions
is motivating organisms to act (LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1990). In
this respect, emotions interface between sensory inputs and
motor outputs in a way that allows the individual to take a particu-
lar motivational stance (Aureli & Whiten 2003; cf. Tooby & Cos-
mides’ [1990b] system of coordination), which then constrains its
behavior for an appropriate amount of time (e.g., a longish period
in the case of fear caused by sighting a snake; cf. Damasio 1994;
Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1992).
The concept of relationship value is central to the forgiveness
system hypothesized in the target article and to reconciliation
between former opponents, as acknowledged by the authors.
However, the expected value of social relationships does not
need complex computation about the future. Most of our
decisions are not taken based on improbable knowledge of the
future, but are guided by probabilistic estimates based on past
experience (Tooby & Cosmides 1990b). This is especially true
for social intercourse as current behavior is affected, entirely or
in part, by the individual’s memory of past interactions (Aureli
et al., in press; Hinde 1979; Seyfarth & Cheney 2012). The assess-
ment of social relationships requires bookkeeping of the various
interactions with the partner, computation of their relative fre-
quencies, and conversion of their quality and associated infor-
mation into a common currency. Such an assessment seems to
be complex. However, emotions can play a critical role.
Emotional mediation has already been suggested to be at the
basis of the assessment of social relationships (Aureli & Schaffner
2002). The emotional experience of an individual is certainly
affected by the frequency and quality of previous interactions
with group members (see Aureli & Schino [2004] for a review).
Furthermore, emotional states may express a crucial integration
of the information contained in the various interactions between
two partners and may change over time depending on the inter-
actions exchanged. The emotional experience can then be func-
tionally equivalent to the aforementioned processes of
bookkeeping, computation, and conversion needed for relation-
ship assessment (Aureli & Schaffner 2002). The resulting emotion-
al experience is partner-dependent. Thus, emotional differences
can be at the core of the observed variation in social interactions
reflecting the variation in relationship quality across partners.
Biological systems do not emerge ex novo as elegant solutions,
but develop from pre-existing structures and therefore are
constrained by their evolutionary past. Humans have the abilities
for complex computations as required by the proposed revenge
and forgiveness systems, but they usually rely on evolutionarily
older systems. Quick and accurate decision-making is based on
the exploitation of how information is structured in the social
environment mediated by emotions (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
Similarly, emotions can serve as somatic markers that allow
rapidly rejecting or endorsing certain options based on the reacti-
vation of emotional states associated with previous experiences
and permitting the individual to efficiently make a decision
(Damasio 1994; 1996).
When revenge spreads from the two opponents to family
members, as in mafia vendettas, it seems more cognitively
demanding because the individuals involved need to know about
the relationships of others and the degree of similarity with
their own relationships. Such family based revenge has already
been reported in monkeys (Aureli et al. 1992; Judge 1982; Sey-
farth & Cheney, in press). This suggests that even the cognitive
processes underlying vendettas are not unique to human beings.
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Abstract: We address how trait self-control and trait concern for others
relate to the concepts of monitored and intrinsic Welfare Tradeoff
Ratios (WTRs), respectively, and how recent work on personality,
revenge, and forgiveness are informed by the adaptationist perspective
proposed in the target article. We also discuss how the proposed
adaptationist perspective provides clues to some previously puzzling
findings on revenge.
In the target article, McCullough et al. forward a timely adapta-
tionist framework for conceptualizing revenge and forgiveness.
According to this theoretical perspective, revenge and forgiveness
are evolved psychological mechanisms that regulate the interper-
sonal behavior of a victim in response to the harm-doing of a trans-
gressor. Central to their model is the mechanism of Welfare
Tradeoff Ratios (WTRs) in conducting cost–benefit analyses of
interdependent social behaviors. WTRs are psychological mech-
anisms that compute the relative welfare of a target’s welfare com-
pared to one’s own welfare. In the target article the authors make
a distinction between intrinsic and monitored WTRs. Intrinsic
WTRs involve welfare tradeoffs that consider the indirect benefits
a particular relationship has for the individual’s own welfare,
whereas monitored WTRs involve computations of a welfare-tra-
deoff taking into consideration the target’s ability to monitor and
respond to one’s behavior. In light of this theoretical framework,
we review recent research relating personality with revenge and
forgiveness and suggest how this perspective may explain some
recent unexpected findings in the literature.
Research suggests that forgiveness can be challenging, and that
forgiveness is facilitated by the use of self-control – an ability to
monitor and regulate behavior to achieve long-term goals
(Balliet 2010; Pronk et al. 2010). Additionally, prior research has
found that self-control increases the ability to positively weigh
others’ outcomes (i.e., WTRs) during interdependent social inter-
actions (Balliet & Joireman 2010). Thus, self-control is not only
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relevant for revenge/forgiveness, but may also affect the proxi-
mate mechanisms outlined in the target article, namely WTRs.
Can the relation between self-control, forgiveness, and revenge
be understood by the adaptationist model? Here we suggest
that self-control may work together with evolved psychological
mechanisms (e.g., WTRs) to affect revenge and forgiveness.
Specifically, individual differences in self-control may aid our
understanding of monitoredWTRs. People who monitor their be-
havior in relation to goals during social interactions, thereby exert-
ing self-control, may be more thoughtful about how their own and
other’s current behavior may affect future outcomes. Another
possibility is that self-control is used to compare other’s perceived
WTRs to one’s ownWTR, and this process may affect revenge and
forgiveness. Although previous research suggests that self-control
may enable people to inhibit their desire for revenge in order to
maintain valuable social relations, as we discuss below, self-
control can also enable people to become more vengeful. Other
traits may relate to individual differences in the calibration of
intrinsic WTRs (such as social value orientations; see Balliet
et al. 2009). Importantly, both features of personality that affect
monitored and intrinsic WTRs may interact to affect revenge
and forgiveness.
Recently, Balliet et al. (2011a) measured intentions of revenge
in response to a partner’s initial transgression during an iterated
prisoner’s dilemma (and maximizing difference game). They
found that trait self-control negatively related to revenge in
response to their partner’s defection, but only amongst individuals
who were less concerned for others’ outcomes, relative to their
own outcomes (i.e., low intrinsic WTRs). In this experimental
context, participants were thought to be interacting for several
trials of the dilemma. One implication of this finding is that self-
control may affect calculating concern for anonymous others,
and especially in situations when another has an ability to
respond and punish one’s behavior. Certainly, in the context of
each iterated game, mutual cooperation is in the long-term self-
interest for both parties. Thus, self-control may be a general
ability that works by adjusting (monitored) WTRs to manage
social relations and achieve long-term outcomes for the individual.
A second implication is that the effect of self-control on revenge
may depend on a person’s intrinsic WTR.
An unexpected finding in recent work is that positive intrinsic
WTRs can lead to stronger revenge motivation in response to a
perceived transgression, but only when people have the time
and exert self-control to think about the costs and benefits of
revenge (Balliet et al. 2011a; Perunovic & Holmes 2008).
Perhaps high intrinsic WTRs establish expectations of social be-
havior that are easily violated, and self-control may initiate a
comparison between own and an other’s perceived WTRs
that may subsequently encourage revenge in an attempt to
get the other to recalibrate their monitored WTR to reach an
equilibrium with their own. Yet, for individuals who have a
low intrinsic WTR, the use of self-control may result in
attempts to display an increase in their own WTR toward the
other. Interestingly, in both accounts self-control may encou-
rage strategies to reach an equilibrium between one’s own
and the other’s WTR.
A second finding not easily explained by existing theories is that
punishment more effectively increases cooperation when punish-
ments are costly to deliver (Balliet et al. 2011b). Prior theorizing
suggests that reduced costs of punishment make punishment
more effective at promoting cooperation. Yet, this finding may
indicate the importance of others’ perceived WTRs for revenge
and forgiveness. Not only do people possess their own WTR,
but also cognitive mechanisms disposed toward understanding
others’ WTRs, and these hold important implications for both
own intrinsic and monitored WTRs. Perhaps costly punishments
communicate that punishment is delivered out of concern for
the relationship or group and so may be more effective by simul-
taneously increasing the transgressor’s own intrinsic WTR as well
as the monitored WTR.
As we reflected on the ability of an adaptationist perspective to
guide research on revenge and forgiveness, we noticed in several
instances that this perspective could be meaningfully related to
conclusions from our own research and is able provide clues to
some previously puzzling findings. Specifically, trait self-control
and trait concern for others may affect forgiveness by the cali-
bration of monitored and intrinsic WTRs, respectively – a possi-
bility that deserves future research attention. Overall, we are
excited about the possibility of this model directing future
research. Managing social relations certainly provided an abun-
dance of challenges in our ancestral environment that were
directly relevant to survival and reproduction. Taking revenge to
deter harm and forgiving others to maintain vital social relations
are likely two important ingredients that have enabled humans
to successfully navigate the social environment.








Abstract: The target article’s important point is easily misunderstood to
claim that all revenge is adaptive. Revenge and forgiveness can
overstretch (or understretch) the bounds of utility due to
misperceptions, minimization of costly errors, a breakdown within our
evolved revenge systems, or natural genetic and developmental
variation. Together, these factors can compound to produce highly
abnormal instances of revenge and forgiveness.
In the target article, McCullough et al. do an admirable job of
arguing that revenge is not a disease, and instead may be an adap-
tion to prevent exploitation. This approach is long overdue in
many social sciences, as it moves away from pejorative preconcep-
tions about behaviours we don’t like. As with any adaptive expla-
nation for behaviour, there is a high risk of the authors’ argument
being misunderstood to claim that all instances of revenge should
be adaptive. Such misunderstandings regularly occur with other
evolutionary explanations of human social behaviour. As such,
the authors’ argument requires extension to examine when
revenge and forgiveness will overstretch (or understretch) the
bounds of utility, and why.
A complete explanation of revenge and forgiveness will include
errors of absence as well as errors of excess. While there are popu-
larized cases of ridiculous revenge, we often overlook the exces-
sive “lack of revenge” or excessive forgiveness. These are the
things that fill books like Chicken Soup for the Soul. They are
potentially equally maladaptive, but we don’t see them as
“errors” because we “like” this behaviour (see also Wakefield
1992). There is likely an optimal level of revenge and forgiveness
for any situation. Too little revenge is an insufficient deterrent, but
too much revenge invites further retaliation (Barclay 2008). Too
little forgiveness prevents reparation of a relationship, but too
much forgiveness invites future exploitation (Axelrod 1984).
Finding the optimal level of revenge involves “brinksmanship”
(Daly & Wilson 1988), a difficult game when people have imper-
fect information about the world or about others’ past and future
intentions (e.g., Todd 2001). Because of such constraints, no
evolved psychological mechanism is expected to produce
optimal results in every single instance, but is expected to be adap-
tive on average (Haselton & Buss 2000; Nesse 2005; Barclay
2011). The following are some causes of excessive or insufficient
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